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Abstract
This paper o¤ers to investigate both the Friedmans and Mishkins hy-
potheses on the consequences of ination on output growth. To this end, we
rst base these hypotheses in a unied framework. Second, in an empirical
work based on OECD countries, we distinguish between short-medium and
long run and between headline and core ination.
We get two main results. First, nominal uncertainty and ination are
positively linked. Second, headline ination negatively Granger causes out-
put gap (US, Japan, France) but has no e¤ect on potential output growth
(US excepted) whereas core ination impacts potential output growth (UK,
Germany) but not output gap (US excepted).
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1 Introduction
Negative e¤ects of ination on output growth are well known at least in the long
run. For Friedman (1980): "Ination, particularly highly variable ination, in-
terferes with growth by (a) introducing static into the messages transmitted by
the price system, increasing the uncertainty facing individuals and business enter-
prises, which encourages them to divert attention from productive to protective
activities, and (b) inducing governments to adopt such counterproductive false
cures as price controls and incomes policy. These adverse e¤ects have sometimes
been more than o¤set by other forces, so that high ination has not prevented
rapid growth" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1980, pp. 55-6). Conversely, the stabi-
lization of ination rate at a low level is able to improve output growth. This
friedmanite hypothesis was carefully scrutinized and related econometric studies
undertaken can be classied into the following three surrounding issues. The rst
one relates to whether high ination rates might result in more variable ination
and to, subsequently, create more unpredictability in future ination. However,
there appears contradictory evidence of the causal relationship between ination
levels and ination uncertainty and this leaves macroeconomists uneasy whether
the Friedman-Ball (Friedman, 1977 and Ball, 1992) hypothesis really holds (see
Davis and Kanago, 2000; Fountas, 2001; Fountas et al., 2002; Grier et al., 2004;
Kontonikas, 2004; and Thornton, 2006). The second issue relates to the welfare
loss associated with ination so that unpredictable future ination tends to distort
the e¢ cient allocation of resources through the price mechanism and, hence, to
lower total output. Studies that tested the link between the ination variability
and the output growth include Grier and Perry (2000), Hayford (2000), Fountas
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et al. (2002), Aspergis (2004) and Grier et al. (2004). The results found in these
studies are mixed. And nally, the last issue investigates the link between the
level and the variability of both ination and growth (refer to Wilson and Culver,
1999; Grier et al., 2004; Wilson, 2006; and Fountas and Karanasos, 2007), which
addresses the simultaneous feedback between the variables of interest. The results
derived are also mixed and depend on the samples and econometric methodologies
employed.
In the short run, Mishkin (2008) hightlights in a seminal paper that ination
also negatively impacts output growth. Both demand and supply shocks can lead
to unstable ination and a diminution of output growth below its potential level.
For example, a negative shock to aggregate demand (a decline of consumer or rm
condence) implies a cut of households or rms spendings. As a result, future
ination and output gap will decrease. Supply shocks can also lead to ination
unstability and a fall of output gap. For New Keynesian models, this negative
correlation between ination and growth is mainly due to misalignment of em-
ployment to its e¢ cient level (Blanchard (1997), Ercberg, Henderson and Levin
(2000)) and ine¢ ciencies in labor market search (Blanchard and Galí (2006), Galí,
Gertler and Lopez-salido (2007)). On its side, the New Neoclassical Synthesis
shows that, as some prices move sluggishly, ination distorts relative prices be-
tween goods and services (Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), Woodford (2003)) and thus reduces ouput growth.
Hence, according to both Friedmans andMishkins hypotheses, we must expect
a signicant causality of ination on output gap and potential output growth.
Furthermore, as the increase of ination must lead to a diminution of output
growth, we must observe that nominal variables negatively explain real variables.
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In this paper, we o¤er to evaluate the impacts of ination on both output gap
and potential output growth for main OECD countries. Implicitely based on the
Friedmans and Mishkins hypotheses, the mandate assigned to Central Bank is to
achieve price stability at a medium-long run. In this perspective, we may expect
that ination inuences both the output gap and the medium-long run output
growth.
Moreover, we distinguish between headline ination and core ination, mea-
sured by CPI less food and energy. The concept of core ination, developed in
the early 1970s by Eckstein (see Eckstein, 1981), can be dened as the ination
rate for which the employment of labor and capital would be stabilized. According
to Catte and Slok (2005), core ination "is connected to the fundamental drivers
of the ination process: excess demand for goods and services, changes in unit
labour costs and, ultimately, monetary policy" and is assimilated to "the gener-
alised component of ination that is, with the common factor (or a set of common
factors) driving all CPI components". These dentions imply that ination.can be
decomposed in two components: core ination and a transient component. This
distinction between these two components of ination must be associated with
the distinction made by Friedman (1963) between a steady ination, one that
proceeds at a more or less constant rate, and an intermittent ination, one that
proceeds by ts and starts. Most Central Banks base their ination calculations
on consumer price index (Hereafter CPI) rather than on Producer Price Index be-
cause CPI well reects reductions in economic e¢ ciency (Rich and Steindel, 2005):
rst, CPI variations capture the component of aggregate price movements of goods
and services and second, CPI variations imply indexing arrangements that involve
somewhat arbitrary reallocations of income across group.
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The more familiar core ination measure as aggregate price growth excluding
food and energy was rst analyzed by Robert Gordon (Gordon, 1975) and was then
adopted by most Central Banks. However, this measure of core ination is subject
to debates among Central Bankers. Reserve Federal shifted from CPI less food
and energy in February 2000 toward Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)
deator less food and energy as measure of core ination in order to take into
account the quarter modications of consumption baskets. CPI and PCE indexes
are both based on consumer prices but the latter one is calculated as a chained
index. Note, however, that these two measures of core ination both exclude food
and energy prices. For Mishkin (2007), member of the Board of the Reserve Federal
System, core ination has many limitations, even if it cannot take into account all
possible shocks, is valuable for the conduct of monetary policy as it "provides some
greater signal about persistent movements in ination than does headline ination
itself". On its side, J.C. Trichet (2008), the ECB governor , worries about the
exclusion of energy and food prices in the calculation of European core ination:
ECB research has in particular shown that for the euro area standard measures of
core ination, excluding energy and unprocessed food prices, do not have desirable
leading indicator properties(14 February 2008). This concern is explained by the
recent rise in world prices of raw materials and their possible e¤ects on medium-
long run price stability inside the Euro area and hence on output growth.
This paper provides several contributions. First, we base both the Friedmans
and Mishkins hypotheses in a theroretical macroeconomic framework. More pre-
cisely, we develop a unied model to highlight all possible origins of uncertainty.
Second, we implement a Christiano and Fitzgerald lter (hereafter CF lter) to de-
compose output series in potential output growth, output gap and real uncertainty.
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Moreover, as Fountas and Karanasos (2007), we extract ination variability using
a threshold-GARCH or TGARCH model where asymmetric e¤ects of good news
and bad news are possible but contrary to them, we use both headline ination
and core ination to extract uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows: the theoretical framework relative to the
links between monetary disturbances and macroeconomic performance is proposed
in section 2 ; section 3 presents the original procedure; section 4 reports our results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Ination, ouput growth, nominal and real un-
certainty: A unied framework
The foregoing analysis of the paper is based on the following theoretical framework:
yt  ypt + zt + "t (1)
ypt = + y
p
t 1 + 
2
 (2)
zt =  ' (L) (it   Et 1t) +  (L) zt + 2 + gt (3)
t = km +  (L)t +  (L) zt + "t "t

t 1  N  0; 2t  (4)
 = r +  (5)
it = +  [Ett+k   ] + z [Etzt+l] + M

mMTLRt  m

(6)
it = it 1 + (1  ) it + t (7)
mt   pt = kyyt   kiit + wt (8)
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where: yt is the actual value of real GDP; zt is the output gap; y
p
t is the potential
actual value of real GDP; it is the nominal interest rate; Et is the conditional
expectation calculated at date t; t is the ination rate; gt denotes a goods demand-
side shock; "t denotes a supply-side shock; pt is the price level; mt denotes the
money supply; wt denotes a money demand shock (all of the variables, except for
the interest rate, are expressed as logarithms); mMTLRt and m
d;MTLR
t denote,
respectively, the medium-term/long run (MTLR) components of money supply
and money demand growth. m summarizes the excess of MTLR nominal money
growth over MTLR real money demand growth
Eq. (3) is an IS curve, where output gap depends on real interest rate and of
its past values. Following the Mishkins hypothesis (2008), we introduce in this
equation ination uncertainty. ' (L) and  (L) are lag operators.
Eq. (4) is a « two-pillar » Phillips curve (Gerlach, 2004). It is a standard
backward-looking Phillips curve, but with the intercept (km) depending on the
medium term /long run (MTLR) component of money supply growth relative to
the MTLR component of real money demand growth.  (L) and  (L) stand for
lag operators.
Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) represent the central banks behaviour. Eq. (6) indicates
that the desired value of the nominal interest rate for the current period (it )
is determined by monetary authorities according to an Irelands rule (Ireland,
2004). Like an ination target, this rule calls for the Central bank to adjust the
short-term nominal interest rate in reaction to deviations of expected ination and
output from their steady-state levels to assure monetary stability in the short-run
to medium term. However, this rule also calls for the Central bank to adjust the
short-term interest rate to deviations of actual money growth from its medium-
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term to long run reference value corresponding to the steady state level of nominal
money demand. In the case where the interest rate is determined according to the
Friedmans k-percent money supply rule.
Eq. (8) is a Friedman-Meltzer type specication of the demand for money
(Nelson, 2002) where it depends negatively on the return rate on its substitutes -
equities, bonds, physical capital - and positively on the interest rate on monetary
assets.
The model encapsulates the proposal we are interested in here. According to
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), ination uncertainty, due mainly to monetary disturbances,
impacts negatively on economic growth as represented by potential output growth
and output gap.
3 Empirical analysis
According to the theoretical model, the test of the Friedmans and Mishkins hy-
potheses is based on the comparison between ination rate, ination variability
(nominal uncertainty), output variability (real uncertainty), output gap and po-
tential output growth. In order to get the convenient series, we implement an orig-
inal method based on the CF lter to get output components and the TGARCH
model to extract nominal uncertainty.
3.1 Decompostion of GDP using the CF lter
The decomposition of GDP in a cyclical, a non-cyclical component and an error
term in order to test the Friedmans hypothesis can be apprehensive about lters
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as:
yt  ypt + zt + "t
where ypt is the potential output growth, zt the output gap and "t the real shock.
More precisely, econometric techniques o¤er the possibility of extracting cycles
that move in given frequency bands (cf. Hodrick and Prescott, 1997; Baxter and
King, 1999; and Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). Broadly, these methods can
be estimated in the frequency domain by minimizing the conditional expected
mean-squared error:
Min : E

(yt   byt)2 jz  ; z  (z1; :::; zT )
byt is the linear projection of onto every element in the data set, zt is the component
allowed to pass through the lter.
Through these common characteristics, each lter that are the Hodrick-Prescott
lter (1997) (Hereafter the HP lter), the Baxter-King lter (1999) (hereafter the
BK lter)) and the CF lter presents singular features. Contrary to the HP lter,
the BK and CF lters can be implemented as well for business cycles (between
1.5 years to 8 years) than for higher frequencies (short run shocks) and lower fre-
quencies (the long run or potential output). Compared to the BK lter, the CF
lter uses all observations of a series while the BK lter does not (Cf. Shelley and
Wallace, 2005).
In what follows, we implement the CF lter to output data, according to its
robustness. We proceed as follows. First, we seasonally adjust ouput series using
Census X12 and we isolate the trend cycle component, Ct, that measures variation
due to the long-term trend, the business cycle, and other long-term cyclical factors.
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Then, using the CF lter, we isolate the business cycle from the potential output.
where the considered frequency domain lies between 18 months (1.5 years) to
96 months (8 years). At this stage, output is decomposed as the sum of the
cyclical series including the business cycle. Real shocks (considered hereafter as
real uncertainty) are obtained by substracting the trend cycle component from the
seasonally adjusted output series.
3.2 Extraction of nominal uncertainty
After having decomposed output, we use a TGARCH(p,q) model for extract-
ing nominal uncertainty. The model assumes that the persistence in the dy-
namics comes from the conditional second moment of the series. Although the
GARCH(p,q) conditional variance model is widely used, there are other alterna-
tives to represent the conditional variance of the ination rate. In the standard
GARCH(p,q) model, positive and negative residuals have a symmetric impact on
the conditional variance. However it seems relevant to incorporate a threshold
element and introduces a Threshold-GARCH (p,q) model, hereafter, TGARCH,
that allows for negative residuals to have a di¤erent impact on the conditional
variance than do positive residuals (Glosten, et. al. 1993):
t = 0 + 1 (L)t + 2 (L) zt + "t "t

t 1  N  0; 2;t
2;t = ! +  (L) "
2
t + 
 
"2t 1  It 1

+  (L)2;t
 (L) =
pX
i=1
iL
i;  (L) =
qX
i=1
iL
i; 1 (L) =
rX
i=1
1iL
i; 2 (L) =
rX
i=1
2iL
i
It 1 =
8><>: 1; if "t 1 < 00; otherwise
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where t is the ination rate; zt is the output gap component on potential output,
"t error term; 
t 1, available information set in period t-1; L stands for the lag
operator, 2;t, the conditional variance of ination which depends linearly on past
squared-error terms, past variances and on the negative shocks of 0; 1; 2;! >
0; i; i  0 are parameters to be estimated.
It 1 = 1 if "t 1 < 0 and 0 otherwise. If the asymmetry parameter  is negative
then negative inationary shocks result in the reduction of ination uncertainty.
We include variables in the mean equation by implementing a stepwise process
based on a Schwarz criterion. More precisely, the method begins with no added
regressors. We select the variable that would lead to the lowest Schwarz value
of the TGARCH model were it added to the regression. If the Schwarz value is
lower than the Schwarz value of selected regression, the variable is added. The
selection goes on by selecting the variable that gives the lowest Schwarz value of
the regression, given the inclusion of the rst variable. The procedure stops when
the Schwarz value of regressions with not yet included variables is greater than the
Schwarz value of the selected regression. The maximum number of lags for each
variable is 12.
4 Data and results
The empirical work is based on monthly data of Consumer Price Index (headline
CPI), Consumer Price Index less food and energy (core CPI) and the Industrial
Price Index (IPI) obtained from the OECD database for US, Japan, UK, Canada,
France and Germany. These series are respectively used as proxies of general price
level and output. Our analysis covers the period 1957M2-2007M12.
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We proceed in several steps.
First, using the methodology presented in section 3, we decompose IPI series
in a cyclical, a non-cyclical component and an error term (See gures in annex).
Second, we test for unit roots. ADF tests (with 4 lags) indicate that we can
reject the null hypothesis for all considered series at 1% level (Table 1).
[Table 1 here]
Third, we extract the variability of (headline) ination (i.e. nominal uncer-
tainty) using TGARCH models (Table 2). The relevant variables are determined
by a stepwise analysis based on a Schwarz criterion where the maximum number
of lags for ination and real output growth is equal to 12.
Results show that headline ination and real output growth are signicantly
and positively linked in US, UK and Germany. For the other countries, our results
highlight that real output growth is not a signicant determinant of ination. The
conditional variance equation of ination rate (ination uncertainty) shows that
asymetries are signicant for US, Japan, UK and Germany but not for Canada and
France. Moreover, each variance is dened and stable as the sum of coe¢ cients is
positive and inferior to 1.
[Table 2 here]
In order to implement Granger causality tests of the Friedmans hypothesis,
we build a VAR model between ination, nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty
(as dened in section 3) and output gap or potential output growth. The optimal
number of lags is determined by a Schwarz criterion.
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With regards to the short run where output gap is included to the VAR system
(table 3), Granger causality tests o¤er three main results. First, they indicate a
causality between ination and uncertainty of ination US, Japan, UK, Canada
and France but not in Germany. According to the VAR coe¢ cients this link is
positive, which coincides to a part of the Mishkins hypothesis: the higher the
ination, the higher the nominal uncertainty. Second, our results bring to the
fore that output gap positively Granger causes ination in all considered OECD
countries, France excepted. Third, evidence is mixed regarding the link between
nominal uncertainty and output gap: even if the sign is negative in all cases, as
suggested by the Mishkins hypothesis, Granger causality is only signicant for
US, Japan and France1.
[Table 3 here]
The test of the Friedmans hypothesis o¤ers mixed results (table 4). As in
the short run, ination positively Granger causes nominal uncertainty, Germany
excepted. However, the link between nominal and real variables is not signicant in
most countries: ination negatively Granger causes potential output growth only
for the US.
Table 4 also highlights that potential output growth negatively Granger causes
real uncertainty in all considered countries.
[Table 4 here]
This last result may be explained by the fact that headline ination is not the
best measure of long run ination and thus cannot have any impact on potential
1As the series of nominal uncertainty is built from estimated coe¢ cients, we test the robustness
of these results with bootstrap techniques. Results are quite robust (and available on request).
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output growth (Mishkin, 2007). Hence, we proceed to a similar analysis (i.e., VAR
and Granger analysis) with core ination, based on the CPI less food and energy
(tables 5 and 6).
In the short run, our results show that core ination gives quite similar re-
sults as those obtained with headline ination (table 5). Core ination positively
Granger causes nominal uncertainty in all countries, Canada and Germany ex-
cepted. Results are less clear about the link between core ination and output
gap: if output gap positively Granger causes core ination US, Japan and Ger-
many, core ination has no impact on output gap for any country. This result
may be explained by the fact that core ination only modies output growth in
the medium-long run.
[Table 5 here]
In the long run, however, the link between nominal variables and potential
output growth is signicant only for UK and Germany (table 6). For UK, results
are quite surprising as core ination positively Granger causes potential output
growth. Note however that nominal uncertainty negatively Granger causes poten-
tial output growth. Hence, core ination, measured as CPI less food and energy
prices movements does not appear to be a better indicator of long run price move-
ments, Germany and UK excepted.
[Table 6 here]
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides several ndings. First, the Friedmans and Mishkins hypothe-
ses are formulated within an unied theoretical framework. Second, we suggest to
decompose output growth in potential output growth, output gap and a residual
in order to disinguish between the short run Mishkins statement and the medium-
long run Friedmans hypothesis. Third, we implement TGARCH methods in order
to extract nominal uncertainty. Then, we both test the Mishkin and Friedmans
proposals with Granger causality tests on headline and core ination, nominal
uncertainty, real uncertainty, output gap and potential output growth.
Our results show that both headline and core ination are positively linked with
nominal uncertainty. Headline ination negatively Granger causes output gap in
US, Japan, UK Canada and Germany but has no impact on potential output
growth, US excepted. Compared to headline ination, core ination, measured
as CPI less food and energy prices movements, is better for taking into account
fundamental drivers of the ination process only in UK and Germany. This result
may be explained by the fact that our measure of core ination is a basic measure
that is not necessarily the most accurate: a prolongation to this paper would be
to implement our method by considering ner measures of core ination.
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 Table 1 
ADF unit root tests 
Variables US Japan UK Canada France Germany 
Real uncertainty ‐12.65***  ‐12.17***  ‐12.79***  ‐12.15***  ‐16.23***  ‐11.93*** 
Output gap ‐4.14***  ‐4.56***  ‐4.25***  ‐4.48***  ‐4.55***  ‐5.00*** 
Potential output growth ‐6.95***  ‐3.53***  ‐7.32***  ‐6.19***  ‐7.14***  ‐5.69*** 
Inflation ‐5.58***  ‐6.83***  ‐6.01***  ‐5.48***  ‐4.21***  ‐9.14*** 
Core inflation ‐4.49***  ‐5.17***  ‐5.57***  ‐4.72***  ‐4.12***  ‐8.43*** 
Nominal uncertainty ‐5.73***  ‐3.23**  ‐2.88**  ‐7.66***  ‐8.81***  ‐8.39*** 
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. ADF unit root tests 
are implemented with 4 lags. 
  
Table(s)
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Table 2 
T-GARCH(1,1) models 
US Japan UK Canada France Germany 
Mean equation (dependent variable : Headline inflation) 
Inflation  
t-1 0.28*** 0.09***  0.29*** 0.16*** 
t-2 0.12** 
t-3 0.13*** 0.18*** 
t-4 0.17*** 
t-6 0.12*** 0.15***  0.21** 
t-7 0.16***  
t-9 0.12** 
t-10  0.13** 
t-11 0.15***  
t-12 0.22*** 0.55*** 0.66*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.5*** 
Output growth  
t-2 0.05***  
t-5 0.04*  
t-7 0.04***  
t-12  0.02*** 
ߛ₀ෝ  3.79E-04*** 4.68E-04*** 3.42E-04*** 7.02E-04*** 2.46E-04*** 4.66E-04*** 
Variance Equation (࣌ෝ࣊,࢚૛ ) 
ෝ߱ 7.46E-07*** 5.18E-07* 2.06E-07 8.79E-07* 2.76E-06** 1.30E-06** 
ߝ௧̂ିଵଶ  0.28*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.07** 0.16 0.06* 
ߝ௧̂ିଵଶ ൈ ܫ௧ିଵ -0.2** -0.13*** -0.17*** -0.06 -0.1 0.18* 
ߪො௧ିଵଶ  0.71*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.89*** 0.4* 0.69*** 
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
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Table 3 
Granger-causality tests between headline inflation, nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and 
output gap 
US Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   115.13***(+)  1.89(+)  13.6**(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 8.91(+)    12.79***(‐)  2.71(‐) 
Output gap 18.09***(+)  6.12(+)    8.43(+) 
Real uncertainty 4.88(+)  3.98(+)  2.86(+)   
     
Japan Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   393.82***(+)  4.75(+)  7.97*(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 80.9***(+)    12.05***(‐)  4.28(‐) 
Output gap 35.64***(+)  10.25**(+)    4.37(+) 
Real uncertainty 1.87(‐)  7.82*(+)  2.87(‐)   
     
UK Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   344.08***(+)  1.14(+)  7.29(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 32.3***(+)    6.79(‐)  2.42(‐) 
Output gap 15.35***(+)  7.48(+)    8.19(+) 
Real uncertainty 7.1(+)  7.07(‐)  11.2**(+)   
     
Canada Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   218.64***(+)  1.1(+)  3.09(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 15.29***(‐)    5.75(‐)  2.11(‐) 
Output gap 9.18*(+)  4.44(+)    6.28(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.07(+)  3.28(‐)  4.72(+)   
     
France Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   117.34***(+)  1.28(‐)  3.91(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 6.88(‐)    15.84***(‐)  3.39(+) 
Output gap 5.31(+)  7.08(+)    7.31(+) 
Real uncertainty 8.87(+)  1.54(‐)  20.65***(+)   
     
Germany Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   4.55(+)  2.23(+)  4.05(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 17.67***(+)    0.29(‐)  2.51(‐) 
Output gap 8.08*(+)  9.12*(+)    2.3(‐) 
Real uncertainty 4.09(‐)  3.88(+)  6.69(+)   
     
Notes: A (+) (resp. (-)) indicates that the sum of the lagged coefficients of the causing variable is positive when (+) or 
negative when (-). ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
Numbers are the Chi-squared. 
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Table 4 
Granger-causality tests between headline inflation, nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and 
potential output growth 
 
US Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   127.66***(+)  11.54**(‐)  3.56(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 15.24***(+)    7.16(‐)  1.74(‐) 
Potential output 12.05**(+)  0.66(+)    95.13***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 0.68(‐)  1.43(+)  4.95(+)   
     
Japan Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   415.6***(+)  1.59(‐)  5.08(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 54.01***(+)    1.84(+)  3.37(‐) 
Potential output 6.37*(+)  1.83(‐)    19.59***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.26(‐)  5.4(+)  3.26(+)   
     
UK Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   326.98***(+)  1.45(+)  4.58(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 18.81***(+)    3.35(‐)  1.83(‐) 
Potential output 6.44*(‐)  4.92(+)    91***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 9.52***(+)  1.47(+)  3.45(‐)   
     
Canada Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   204.27***(+)  16.32(‐)  2.25(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 16.1***(+)    5.03(+)  1.99(‐) 
Potential output 2.62*(‐)  0.43(‐)    26.45***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 0.63***(+)  2.83(‐)  5.53(‐)   
     
France Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   123.67***(+)  2.45(‐)  1.75(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 1.17(‐)    1.09(‐)  3.15(+) 
Potential output 1.87(+)  4.79(+)    86.58***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 2.33(+)  1.98(+)  5.1(+)   
     
Germany Headline inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output Real uncertainty 
     
Headline inflation   3.98(+)  4.78(‐)  1.38(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 14.99***(+)    0.87(‐)  3.54(‐) 
Potential output 4.39(‐)  6.02(‐)    48.92***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.6(‐)  5.49(+)  0.79(‐)   
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Table 5 
Granger-causality tests between core inflation, nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and 
output gap 
US Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   27.38***(+)  2.78(+)  12.19*(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 30.23***(+)    13.97**(‐)  28.81***(‐) 
Output gap 19.19***(+)  11.76*(+)    10.13(‐) 
Real uncertainty 6.05(+)  2.6(+)  4.64(+)   
     
Japan Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   154.62***(+)  0.46(+)  2.28(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 64.64***(+)    4.21(‐)  1.16(+) 
Output gap 28.88***(+)  21.52***(+)    1.9(+) 
Real uncertainty 2.24(+)  3.4(‐)  1.89(‐)   
     
UK Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   214.51***(+)  6.45(‐)  9.27(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 15.77**(+)    10.35(‐)  3.44(‐) 
Output gap 9.98(+)  7.82(+)    10.13(+) 
Real uncertainty 15.28**(+)  9.63(‐)  17.91***(+)   
     
Canada Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   33.65***(‐)  3.03(‐)  3.58(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 6.86(+)    3.57(‐)  6.15(‐) 
Output gap 3.98(+)  3.49(+)    5.94(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.06(+)  1.24(‐)  4.57(+)   
     
France Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   113.02***(+)  3.44(‐)  6.93(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 11.94**(+)    9.62*(‐)  8.36(‐) 
Output gap 3.43(+)  8.2(+)    6.77(+) 
Real uncertainty 13.76**(+)  2.62(‐)  22.1***(‐)   
     
Germany Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Output gap Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   3.44(‐)  2.93(‐)  4.97(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 7.54(+)    1.05(‐)  0.87(‐) 
Output gap 10.03*(+)  2.61(+)    2.07(‐) 
Real uncertainty 2.49(‐)  3.67(+)  7.49(+)   
     
Notes: A (+) (resp. (-)) indicates that the sum of the lagged coefficients of the causing variable is positive when (+) or 
negative when (-). ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 6 
Granger-causality tests between core inflation, nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and 
potential output growth 
US Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output  Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   40.26***(+)  8.49(‐)  7.2(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 23.89***(‐)    3.55(‐)  33.28***(+) 
Potential output growth 20.86***(+)  10.34(+)    157.29***(+) 
Real uncertainty 8.85(‐)  3.45(‐)  22.28***(+)   
     
Japan Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output  Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   162.9***(+)  1.22(+)  1.45(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 51.16***(+)    0.59(‐)  1.41(+) 
Potential output growth 9.22**(+)  8.17**(‐)    15.7***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.11(‐)  1.88(‐)  4.09(+)   
     
UK Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output  Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   179.64***(+)  9.28**(+)  4.17(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 18.24***(+)    16.01***(‐)  1.07(+) 
Potential output growth 5.34(+)  6.46*(‐)    78.35***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 14.36***(‐)  0.12(‐)  4(+)   
     
Canada Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output  Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   25.89***(‐)  5.53(‐)  3.57(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 4.59(+)    1.79(+)  3.43(‐) 
Potential output growth 4.91(‐)  1.27(‐)    26.55***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 0.77(+)  1.2(‐)  6.4*(‐)   
     
France Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output  Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   101.99***(+)  2.26(‐)  2.34(‐) 
Nominal uncertainty 12.58***(+)    5.3(‐)  2.3(‐) 
Potential output growth 4.79(+)  7.18*(+)    89.13***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 1.94(+)  2.02(+)  5.02(+)   
     
Germany Core inflation Nominal uncertainty Potential output growth Real uncertainty 
     
Core inflation   2.88(+)  7.55*(‐)  2.23(+) 
Nominal uncertainty 6.34*(+)    0.88(‐)  1.5(‐) 
Potential output growth 4.29(‐)  10.02**(‐)    48.47***(‐) 
Real uncertainty 0.55(‐)  3.6(+)  0.73(‐)   
     
Notes: A (+) (resp. (-)) indicates that the sum of the lagged coefficients of the causing variable is positive when (+) or 
negative when (-). ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Annex: Decomposition of potential output, cyclical output and residual output using the 
Christiano and Fitzgerald’s filter 
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